UK Uses New State-Threat Powers Against Iran- and Russia-Linked Organisations

A new legal tool is put to use

The UK government has moved to use the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 against organisations linked to Iran and Russia, marking a major development in Britain's response to hostile state activity. The measures announced on 13 July include the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right and a Russia-linked GRU Volunteer Corps. The government says the new framework is designed for bodies that operate on behalf of foreign powers or function as proxies, filling a gap between traditional terrorism law and sanctions.

Why the legal distinction matters

Headlines have often described the UK IRGC designation as proscription or a terrorist ban. In practical terms, the restrictions are intended to criminalise support and activity connected with the designated bodies. Legally, however, the mechanism was created specifically for state threats. Traditional proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000 was developed primarily for non-state terrorist organisations. Successive governments had been reluctant to apply that framework to an official arm of a foreign state because doing so raised questions about diplomacy, armed forces and the definition of terrorism. The 2026 Act creates a separate route focused on hostile foreign-power activity.

What the new Act does

The National Security (State Threats) Act received Royal Assent on 8 July 2026. Government guidance says it gives the home secretary power to designate bodies engaged in threat activity linked to a foreign power. The model resembles terrorist proscription in its consequences while remaining legally distinct. New offences can apply to support, assistance or material benefit involving a designated body. The legislation also includes procedures for parliamentary approval and routes through which a designation can be challenged. Ministers argue that the powers are necessary because states increasingly use proxies to conduct arson, sabotage, intimidation, cyber operations and violence while trying to deny responsibility.

The allegations concerning Iran-linked activity

The government says the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right claimed responsibility for a series of attacks involving Jewish institutions, ambulances serving the Jewish community and a Persian-language media outlet critical of Tehran. Reporting linked the group to Iran's Quds Force and described it as a proxy that could recruit or direct people for individual tasks. The UK has also cited a broader pattern of alleged Iranian threats against dissidents and journalists. These claims are central to the designation decision, although individual criminal responsibility must still be proved through normal legal proceedings where specific people are accused.

Why the IRGC has been debated for years

The IRGC is a powerful Iranian military and political institution with responsibility for elite forces, overseas operations and support for allied armed groups. It has long been subject to UK sanctions, but calls to ban it under terrorism law created legal and diplomatic controversy. Supporters of stronger action argued that the organisation was linked to assassination plots, hostage-taking, cyber activity and repression. Opponents or cautious legal analysts warned that treating an official state military body as a terrorist organisation could create complex precedents. The new state-threat law was intended to resolve that problem by focusing on hostile activity and proxy relationships rather than forcing the issue into the older terrorism framework.

The Russia-linked designation

The government is also targeting a GRU Volunteer Corps associated with Russian military intelligence. Russia has been accused across Europe of using intelligence services, contractors and proxy networks for cyber operations, sabotage, espionage and interference. The designation signals that the UK intends to apply the new law beyond Iran. It also complements sanctions and prosecutions under the National Security Act 2023. The strategy is to increase the legal risk not only for core state agencies but also for people and organisations that provide practical support within Britain.

Protection of communities and dissidents

Foreign state proxy threats are not abstract geopolitical issues. They can affect journalists, religious communities, activists, businesses and people who fled authoritarian governments. Jewish communities have faced heightened security concerns following alleged arson and vandalism. Persian-language journalists based in the UK have reported threats connected with their reporting on Iran. The new designations are intended to disrupt networks before violence occurs and to make it easier for police to intervene when support for a hostile body is identified.

Civil liberties and safeguards

Powerful national-security laws require scrutiny. A designation can affect speech, association, journalism, humanitarian work and diplomatic contact. Government factsheets say the legislation includes defences and protections for legitimate activity, including journalism and humanitarian engagement, and is intended to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. Courts and Parliament will play important roles in defining how those protections work in practice. The quality of evidence behind each designation will also matter, particularly if an organisation or affected person seeks review.

Diplomatic consequences

The measures are likely to worsen relations with Tehran and add to confrontation with Moscow. Iran may describe the move as hostile or retaliatory, while Russia is unlikely to accept the UK's characterisation of a GRU-linked body. Diplomatic fallout could include restrictions on British officials, pressure on dual nationals or reduced cooperation. The government must therefore combine deterrence with planning for retaliation. Security agencies will monitor whether designations discourage activity or prompt proxies to adopt new names and methods.

Enforcement will determine effectiveness

Passing a law and announcing designations are only the first steps. Police, prosecutors, banks, charities, technology companies and businesses need clear guidance on prohibited conduct. Investigators must identify financial flows and relationships without treating ordinary contact or protected reporting as criminal. Designated groups may fragment, rebrand or operate through informal intermediaries. Effective enforcement will require intelligence-sharing with allies and regular review of evidence. It will also require public communication so that communities understand the difference between criticism of a foreign government, which is lawful, and practical support for a designated hostile body.

A shift in British national-security policy

The National Security State Threats Act 2026 reflects a wider change in how Britain understands security. The threat is no longer limited to conventional espionage or recognised terrorist organisations. Hostile states can use criminal intermediaries, online influence, cyber tools and small proxy groups to create fear while maintaining deniability. By designating the IRGC and Russia-linked organisations, ministers are testing whether a new legal category can close that gap. The long-term judgement will depend on whether the law prevents attacks, withstands legal challenge and preserves the freedoms it is meant to protect.